Chapter 4: Is it Good to Make Happy People?

If pleasures have intrinsic value, then there would always be reason to bring about additional pleasure. Usually one would do so by bringing pleasure into the life of an existing person, but one could also bring to life someone who would feel pleasure. Is the fact that someone would feel pleasure a reason to bring her into existence? This question raises peculiar issues, not about hedonic value, but about potential persons. I’ll argue that it would be good for additional people to exist whose lives would be worth living. (I’ll refer to people whose lives are worth living as “happy people.”) If so, then part of the reason why such people should exist is that they would feel pleasure.

Arguments Against Additional Happy People Being Good

The No-Obligation Argument

1. If it would be good for additional happy people to exist, then we would be morally obliged to have children.
2. We are not morally obliged to have children.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

The first premise of this familiar argument is questionable. For one thing, creating people who would flourish might be good in one respect yet not be obligatory because countervailing considerations ensure that it would not be good all things considered. Although the new person might be happy, the consequences of bringing him or her into existence might be bad enough for other people that having the child would not be overall good. Second, creating people might be overall good but not good enough to warrant calling it an “obligation,” just as buying Girl Scout cookies is good even though we are not obliged
to do so. Third, having children might be good but involve such sacrifices or be so psychologically demanding that it would be supererogatory rather than obligatory. And finally, having children might not be obligatory because I can better use my time and money. The thousands of dollars required to raise one child can save the lives of many starving children who already exist.

These replies can be circumvented. A variant of the argument goes like this:

1. If it would be good for there to be additional happy people, then, if God exists, God would be obliged to create infinitely many people.
2. If God exists, God would be under no such obligation.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

Now I deny the second premise, as would anyone who rejects the conclusion.

*Failing to Create is Bad for No One*

Consider another argument:

1. If there are reasons against behaving in a certain way, then that behavior is bad for someone.
2. If we do not create additional happy people, our behavior is bad for no one.
C1. Therefore, there are no reasons against not creating additional happy people.
4. But if it would be good for additional happy people to exist, then there would be reasons against not creating them.
C2. Therefore, it is not the case that it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

Parfit’s Non-Identity cases count against premise 1. One such case is “Depletion.” If we adopt a social policy of depleting resources, we both alter the identity of future generations
and lower the future quality of life, although life would still be worth living. Depletion is bad for no one because the people who would exist would be happy, and without depletion they wouldn’t exist. Nevertheless, there is reason not to deplete. iv

Following Narveson, v Bennett endorses a principle similar to premise 1:

The question of whether action A is morally obligatory depends only upon the utilities of people who would exist if A were not performed. vi

Suppose we must perform either action D or action ~D. D results in depletion and ~D does not. Is ~D morally obligatory? If it is, then Bennett’s principle fails because ~D would be obligatory because the utilities of those who would exist were it performed would be greater than the utilities of those who would exist if it were not. Alternatively, perhaps there is reason to perform ~D but ~D is not “morally obligatory”—for example, ~D might be supererogatory, so D would be permissible. This position is consistent with Bennett’s principle but inconsistent with using it to deduce that it isn’t good for additional happy people to exist. For the position affirms that the utilities of people we could create are relevant to whether we have reason to create them; it merely denies that such reasons suffice to create obligations. vii

Tooley’s Appeal to Rights and Obligations

Tooley advances the general thesis:

S: An action is prima facie wrong if and only if it involves a failure to fulfill an obligation regarding some individual, when it was possible to do so, or it makes it the case that there is some individual with respect to whom there will be an obligation that cannot be fulfilled. viii

S revises the idea that, if there are reasons against behaving in a certain way, that behavior is bad for someone. S entails that, if there are reasons against behaving in a certain way, then
that behavior is either bad for someone or creates an obligation that cannot be fulfilled. Thus, S entails that “there is no prima facie obligation to produce additional persons” because “refraining from producing additional persons does not in itself either violate an obligation with respect to any individual, or make it the case that there is an individual with respect to whom there are obligations that cannot be met.” But S doesn’t entail that it is prima facie wrong to fail to create someone with respect to whom obligations can be satisfied. However, when we create a person whose life must be miserable, our obligation to respect that person’s right to life worth living cannot be fulfilled.

Tooley says that S is “free of unacceptable consequences.” By itself, S has few consequences; it needs to be supplemented with principles specifying obligations. However, S is vulnerable to Non-Identity style counterexamples. Consider the case of Carlo and Jane. A woman trying to get pregnant is in danger of passing along a heart condition to her child—but only to a male child. This condition would be unpleasant at times but not fatal. The woman can take a pill to ensure a female child. Without this pill, she might have a boy named Carlo, and with it, she would have a girl called Jane. To ensure that Carlo and Jane are different people, assume that the pill would alter the timing of her pregnancy. Suppose that, if the woman does not take the pill and (unluckily) gives birth to Carlo, Carlo would be provided for, but he would not be nearly as happy as Jane would have been. The woman would be prima facie wrong not to take the pill, even though, if she has Carlo, it seems that she would have no unfulfilled obligations with respect to him.

Tooley agrees that the woman should take the pill. However, he believes that there would be an unfulfilled obligation to Carlo. In defending this claim, he appeals to a principle of equal opportunity:

Every person has a right to an equal chance of enjoying those natural resources, both environmental and genetic, that a person living in his society might enjoy, and that make it possible for one to lead a satisfying life.
Hence, Carlo, with his genetic heart ailment, is denied an equal chance of enjoying at least some important genetic resources.

But there are two problems with this view:

1. Suppose a couple is poor but happy. Would it be prima facie wrong for them to have a child? If we interpret S and the principle of equal opportunity such that they entail that it would be wrong for the woman not to take the pill, then those principles imply that it would be prima facie wrong for poor people to have children. After all, their children would have a less than equal chance of enjoying environmental resources.

   One might think this is acceptable, since the poor couple’s obligation is only a prima facie obligation that could be overridden. But the prima facie obligation can be easily turned into an absolute obligation. First, bear in mind that, according to S, the fact that a person would be happy is not a reason to create her. And suppose that this child’s existence, on the whole, would neither benefit nor harm other people. It then follows that it would be wrong, all things considered, for the poor couple to bring this happy child into the world. This conclusion seems mistaken, especially since the child would be happy, despite enjoying fewer resources than most others.

2. Suppose half the population enjoys all the relevant natural resources. A woman is deciding whether to take a fertility pill with specific side-effects. If she takes the pill, she will have twins. One of those twins (we can’t know which) will be healthy and enjoy all the resources, but the other will become sick and won’t. Taking this pill is permissible, on Tooley’s view, since each twin would have the same chance of enjoying the natural resources as the population at large (one chance in two). (It might count against Tooley’s view that taking the same pill would be unacceptable if 52% of the people in the population enjoy the resources, for then each twin would have a less than equal chance of enjoyment.)
Change the example slightly. Call the twins the woman would have “Lefty” and “Righty.” Suppose the woman knows that Lefty would be the sick one. Now Tooley’s view entails that the woman mustn’t take the pill, since Lefty wouldn’t have a fair chance of enjoying health. But suppose that Lefty is the same person who would have become sick in the original example. Then, on Tooley’s view, taking the first pill is permissible, while taking the second pill is not, even though (i) they would lead to the same result, and (ii) if the second pill led to a different result, that result would be as bad as what would actually happen (Righty’s being sick would be as bad as Lefty’s being sick). This implication counts against Tooley’s theory.

The No-Benefit Argument

Some philosophers say that we do not benefit people by creating them. This suggests the following argument:

1. A person who is created does not benefit from having been created.
2. If a person does not benefit from having been created, then adding that person to the world (even if she would be happy) does not make the world better.

Therefore, it is not the case that it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

The first premise is not obviously true; Parfit deftly defends denying it. Perhaps 1 is supposed to be true for the following reason: a benefit, by definition, promotes one’s interests; but to promote one’s interests, one must, again by definition, have interests. If we define words like this, then the second premise begs the question, for the opposing camp is defined by the belief that we have reason to create happy people even if they don’t benefit in that sense. Similarly, we have reason not to create miserable people even if doing so harms no one.
Some people might be persuaded by this argument:

1. If it would be good for additional happy people to exist, then creating those people must satisfy some of their preferences.
2. Creating happy people does not satisfy any of their preferences.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

We cannot fully understand this argument without knowing what theory of preference lies behind it. However, we understand it well enough to reject it. Consider the following parallel argument:

1. If it would be bad for unhappy people to exist, then creating unhappy people must frustrate some of their preferences.
2. Creating unhappy people does not frustrate any of their preferences.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that it would be bad for additional unhappy people to exist.

The conclusion of this parallel argument is false because it is bad for a person to exist who suffers intensely without compensation. Where does it go wrong? Since the argument is valid, it must have a false premise. But neither of its premises can be denied without undermining the corresponding premise of the No-Preference Argument. Its second premise may be challenged in two ways: (i) creating unhappy people frustrates desires because those people will prefer not to have been born; (ii) creating an unhappy person frustrates those desires that constitute the person’s unhappiness. If either of these is true, then we should be able to say, against the second premise of the No-Preference Argument, that (i) creating happy people satisfies desires because those people will prefer to have been born; or (ii)
creating a happy person satisfies those desires that constitute the person’s happiness. A similar strategy applies to the first premise of the parallel argument. That premise utilizes the principle that what is bad for people must frustrate their preferences. It will be hard to defend this while denying that what is good for people must satisfy their preferences.

In short, the No-Preference Argument stands or falls with its parallel. Since its parallel falls, it falls.

**Contractualism**

Egoistic contract theories base ethics entirely on agreements of mutual benefit. Thus, Gauthier calls contractualism “the morality of mutual advantage” and says that his theory “denies any place to rational constraint, and so to morality, outside the context of mutual benefit.” This implies that I have no reason to create additional happy people, unless doing so benefits me.

Contractual egoism is unsatisfactory because moral reasons exist outside the context of such agreements. If I see an animal suffering, and I can easily help it, I should do so even though the animal cannot help me. And humans who suffer bear the same relation to God, if God exists.

Turn now to a Rawlsian “rightness as fairness” framework. The contractors are still self-interested, but they do not know what place they will occupy in society. Why wouldn’t they prefer that more happy people exist in society? Consider two contractual scenarios:

(a) Suppose that, in the original position, the contractors know they will exist in society. In this case they wouldn’t want additional happy people, provided that the smaller population would be better off, on average, than the larger population. And, given limited resources, this might be the case.
But now rightness-as-fairness has ludicrous implications. For if the contractors know that they will exist in society, then they will prefer society X over society Y if each person in X is better off than each person in Y. And this is often unacceptable when all the people in X and Y have lives not worth living. For example, the contractors would prefer a society in which billions of people live in ghastly, repulsive conditions to one in which five people live in conditions very slightly worse.\textsuperscript{xvii}

(b) Suppose that, in the original position, the contractors do not know whether they will exist in society. Would they be willing to risk not existing by affirming principles that don’t grant the mere potential for happy existence much weight?\textsuperscript{xviii}

If the contractors don’t know whether they will exist in society, it isn’t clear what population principles they would act on. Maximin alone would be a poor guide. For in a population containing only lives worth living, the least advantaged class would be the non-existent, if some contractors do not exist in society. The theory would then imply that ten billion and one lives barely worth living are preferable to ten billion lives of very high quality (plus one life not lived)—an unacceptable result. Of course, the contractors could apply principles characteristic of other theories; questions about population do not show the incompleteness of contractualism or Kantian constructivism. However, contractualism has no distinctive method for answering these questions.

\textit{The No-Sympathy and the Less-Sympathy Arguments}

Some philosophers might emphasize that we are \textit{unmoved} by thoughts concerning potential people. The problem, it might be said, is that, prior to life’s beginning, there is no one with whom to sympathize. Therefore, potential people don’t matter. Alternatively, someone might say, we sympathize with potential people less than living people because we
can’t at this time see, touch or befriend them; because as yet they have no projects or desires; because they can’t help us, harm us or hold us responsible for not creating them.

The arguments are these:

1. We feel no sympathy for potential people.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

1. We have less sympathy for potential people than for living people.
C. Therefore, it would be slightly good for additional happy people to exist.

These arguments are weak because our sympathies are unreliable. Our capacity for sympathy is notoriously underdeveloped, for example, in connection with animal suffering and human starvation. We find it difficult to sympathize with pigs or people we don’t know, but we should oppose factory farming and support human rights. Why shouldn’t something similar be true of our lack of sympathy for potential people? Why shouldn’t the thought that if I were to have a child, that child would be happy move a benevolent adult toward becoming a parent? This thought does not assume that there now exists someone with whom to sympathize.

The Less Sympathy Argument compromises: it concludes that potential people matter but not very much. There is another compromise to consider:

**The Average Utility Compromise**

Some people believe that insofar as utility matters, what matters is average utility or the average level of well-being. Average utilitarianism entails that it is good for there to be additional happy people, but only when their existence augments average utility. However, this is unacceptable because it yields pairs of judgments such as the following:
—It is good to create someone who is mildly happy in a world in which happiness and unhappiness are balanced.

—It is bad to create someone very happy in a world of even higher average happiness.

Other arguments also show that the principle of average utility is mistaken. If a population lives in writhing agony, it would be better with respect to average utility if someone were added to the population whose agony was just a tiny bit less severe because this would increase the average level of well-being. But one more suffering soul does not improve the universe with respect to well-being.\textsuperscript{xiv}

I have now rejected the most important arguments and principles entailing that it is not good for additional happy people to exist.

\textbf{Arguments Supporting Additional Happy People As Good}

\textit{Appeals to Intuition}

Some plausible beliefs suggest that it’s good for additional happy people to exist.

1. It would have been bad if the happiest million people in human history had never been born.

2. It would have been bad if human beings had never evolved (assuming here and in 3 that the good in human life outweighs the bad).

3. It would be wrong for everyone to take a drug that causes both infertility and an indifference to being infertile, thus ensuring that the youngest generation alive will be the last.\textsuperscript{xv}
4. It would be good for God to add ten billion flourishing people to a distant part of the cosmos.

If 1-4 are true, then the best explanation for their truth is that it would be good for additional happy people to exist. 1-4 are true; so it would be good for additional happy people to exist. Against this, one may offer principles and arguments implying that some of 1-4 are false and the rest are true but not because it is good for happy people to exist. I won’t try to adjudicate this dispute, but I submit that 1-4 provide slight evidence for the conclusion.

An Implausible Consequence of Asymmetry

It is bad for people to exist whose lives are not worth living or worse than nothing. This is not to say that such people should be killed; but we do believe it would be better, other things being equal, if such people never came into existence. Consider Seabrook’s remarks:

When one thinks of a truly awful genetic disease, like Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, a rare mutation in the single X chromosome in males which causes mental retardation, extreme physical pain, and compulsive self-mutilation—children savagely gnaw their fingers and lips unless they are constantly constrained—one wonders whether the child who would have to suffer from this condition has a right not to be born.

Now suppose you believe that, while it would be bad for additional unhappy people to exist, it would not be good for additional happy people to exist. This combination of beliefs entails that it is wrong, other things being equal, to act with the predictable consequence that (a) 100,000 happy people come to be, if one’s behavior also creates a slight chance of (b) one person existing whose life is not worth living or worse than nothing. Such behavior would be considered wrong because (b) counts against it while (a) does not count in its favor. Imagine that the one unhappy life would be barely not worth living and that everyone else is
blissful. Does it not seem that the bliss of the one hundred thousand outweighs the chance of mild misfortune for one? If so, then those additional happy people existing is good.

*The Symmetry Argument*

It is bad for people to exist whose lives are not worth living (at least in part) because their conscious states are unpleasant. Analogously, it is good for happy people to exist (at least in part) because their conscious states are pleasant. We can state the Symmetry Argument as follows:

1. The fact that someone’s conscious experiences would be unpleasant is a reason against bringing that person into existence.
2. If (1), then the fact that someone’s conscious experiences would be pleasant is a reason for bringing that person into existence.
C1. Therefore, the fact that someone’s conscious experiences would be pleasant is a reason for bringing that person into existence.
C2. Therefore, it would be good for additional happy people to exist.

The Symmetry Argument is analogical. Just as unpleasant experiences should be avoided, pleasant experiences should be sought. How strong is the analogy? Pleasant and unpleasant experiences are ontologically similar: they are conscious items (whatever consciousness may be). Also, normally we have the same type of epistemic access to each: we know them by introspection. Furthermore, both have normative significance because of how they feel. If a sensation feels good, then to some extent it is good; and if a sensation feels bad, then to some extent it is bad.
Several objections to this argument rely on positions that I have already criticized. Appealing to Tooley’s principle, one might say that we shouldn’t create a miserable person because doing so creates obligations that cannot be fulfilled; but there is no analogous reason to create a blissful person. Or one might say that creating a miserable person is bad for someone, but not creating a happy person is bad for no one. I have already addressed these and other challenges.

**The Analogy Between Parts of Lives and Whole Lives**

Suppose you expect to live many more years of high quality. If tomorrow you were to die tragically in a bizarre gardening accident, this would be bad from anyone’s viewpoint, not merely your own; it is worse that one should die rather than live many golden years before dying. Similarly, it is worse that one should not exist rather than live a golden life before dying. This argument is Parfit’s:

Consider someone dying painfully, who has already made his farewells. . . . He might decide that, at some point in the past, if he had known what lay before him, he would or would not have wanted to live the rest of his life. He might thus conclude that these parts of his life were better or worse than nothing. If such claims can apply to parts of lives, they can apply, I believe, to whole lives.

The argument proceeds by analogy: parts of lives can be good (or bad), so whole lives can be good (or bad). Whole lives and parts of lives are the same sort of entity. It is hard to show a relevant disanalogy between them that does not rely on a principle or argument criticized above.
I have argued in four ways that it would be good for additional happy people to exist. These arguments provide better evidence than the opposing arguments. Therefore, it is good for additional happy people to exist.

**How Valuable is the Happiness of Potential Persons?**

I’ll approach this issue by asking whether the well-being of potential people matters as much as the well-being of actual adults. Suppose that Cayce, an adult, has a life of neutral value. Further suppose that we must choose between (i) raising Cayce’s life to a high level of prosperity and (ii) creating a new person at that high level. Most of us believe that, other things being equal, (i) is better than (ii), and not merely because (i) is better with respect to average utility. Most of us believe that adult potential matters much more than the potential of the unconceived. I believe, however, that (ii) is as good as (i). I will argue for the *Strong Thesis*, which holds that potential people matter as much as adults. The Strong Thesis suggests that potential life should weigh heavily in our reasoning. It entails that *this life would be worth living* provides the same sort of reason for creating life as it does for augmenting and prolonging adult life.

The Strong Thesis should be understood to include the idea that *the longer duration of happy life an individual has in prospect, the stronger the reason for creating or saving her*. So, other things being equal, the reason for prolonging life will be stronger if the individual is younger—say, an infant rather than a college student. This does not entail that infant interests normally outweigh adult interests because our resources often stretch further among adults than among the young. Infants, after all, need considerable care before they can provide for themselves.
A. A version of the Symmetry Argument supports the Strong Thesis. Consider:

**The Strong Thesis As Regards Lives Not Worth Living:** Suppose that Cayce has a life of neutral value. Further suppose we must choose between (i) making Cayce terribly miserable and (ii) creating a new person who will be terribly miserable. (i) is not worse than (ii), assuming away any influence the average principle might have on our assessment. This principle is (plainly) true: potential people becoming actual and suffering is as bad as adults suffering. But if so, then potential people becoming actual and flourishing is as good as adults flourishing. Together these two assertions imply the Strong Thesis. It may seem that disanalogies spoil the argument. However, I tried to answer such objections in assessing arguments against the idea that it is good for additional happy people to exist.

B. The analogy between parts of lives and whole lives can be used to support the Strong Thesis:

1. Parts of my life are better or worse than nothing.
2. If a part of my life is better or worse than nothing, then a whole life of similar quality and duration is exactly as good or bad as that part.

C1. Therefore, whole lives matter as much as parts of lives.
C2. Therefore, potential people matter as much as adults.

As before, the argument rests on a comparison between entities of the same sort: whole lives and parts of lives. I have not found satisfactory arguments to block the analogy.
Conclusion

Our evidence supports the Strong Thesis, according to which the well-being of potential persons matters as much as that of adults. And, in particular, we have just as much reason to promote pleasure, other things being equal, by creating people who would be pleased than by benefiting existing adults.

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i See Peter Unger, *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*.


iii See Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, ch. 16.

iv James Woodward disagree with Parfit’s handling of many Non-Identity cases, but he still thinks that premise 1 is false: “there are at least some Non-Identity cases in which one’s reasons for making a certain choice can only be explained by reference to Q,” where Q states that “If in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.” (James Woodward, “The Non-Identity Problem,” p. 806; also see pp. 811-812 of Woodward’s “Reply to Parfit.”)

v Jan Narveson, “Utilitarianism and New Generations.”


vii R. I. Sikora suggests that Bennett’s principle is subject to Non-Identity style counterexamples in “Is It Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?” pp. 162-163, fn. 18.


x For a similar example, see Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, p. 375.

xi See Tooley, *op. cit.*, sect. 7.33 (especially p. 262) and p. 268.

xii *Ibid.*, p. 272. What does Tooley mean by “those natural resources . . . that make it possible for one to lead a satisfying life?” He does not mean that each natural resource is needed to lead a satisfying life, for then his application of the principle would be invalid. (On p. 273, Tooley uses the principle to show why a woman shouldn’t have a handicapped child, even though such a child could lead a satisfying life.) I interpret the principle to mean “those natural resources . . . that typically make an important contribution to well-being.”


Rawls talks about *rightness as fairness* as a program to apply Rawlsian methods outside the sphere of justice. See *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 17, 111.

Derek Parfit makes a similar criticism. (*Reasons and Persons*, p. 393)

Parfit considers only that version of (b) according to which the contractors do not know whether they will ever exist. This is incoherent because the contractors “cannot assume that, in the actual history of the world, it might be true that [they] never exist.” (*Reasons and Persons*, p. 392) But the contractors can assume that they never exist *in society*. For this reason Parfit’s arguments fail to show that contractualism cannot be applied to questions of population size.

Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, p. 422. Also, see Parfit’s other objections to the average principle in this section.

This comes from Jonathan Glover, *Causing Death and Saving Lives*, p. 69.

To support something like 3, Bennett says “someone might accept a principle enjoining the preservation of every species, or every animal species, or every instance of extreme physical complexity, or every form of life which is capable of moral reflection…” (“On Maximizing Happiness,” p. 65) Bennett, however, believes 3 because he wants our great biological and spiritual adventure to continue. (p. 66) Compare Gregory Kavka on “the collective enterprises of man” in “The Futurity Problem,” pp. 196-198. Tooley says that 3 might be believed because one wants humankind’s understanding of reality to advance, because one wants improved human interaction, or because one wants greater justice or fairer distribution of goods. (*Abortion and Infanticide*, pp. 257-258) In defense of something like 4, Bennett says, “I share Leibniz’s liking for rich, organic complexity, and so the discovery that our world has more of it than we realized would be good news indeed.” (op. cit., p. 64) If so, then it would better for more happy people to exist because then there would be more rich, organic complexity.

John Seabrook, “All in the Genes,” p. 81.


This example is taken from Rob Reiner’s movie, *This Is Spinal Tap*.


R. M. Hare would support the Strong Thesis. See “Abortion and the Golden Rule.”