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1. THE LEGACY OF SOCRATES
1.1 Why Was Socrates Condemned? 1
2. GOD AND THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE
2.1 Is it Reasonable to Believe in God? 10
3. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
3.1 Why Do Good People Suffer? 29
4. DO WE SURVIVE DEATH?
4.1 The Idea of an Immortal Soul 41
5. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
5.1 The Problem 55
6. BODY AND MIND
6.1 Descartes and Elizabeth 71
7. COULD A MACHINE THINK?
7.1 Brains and Computers 89
8. THE CASE AGAINST FREE WILL
8.1 Are People Responsible for What They Do? 101
9. THE DEBATE OVER FREE WILL
9.1 The Determinist Argument 119
10. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD AROUND US
10.1 Vats and Demons 135
11. ETHICS AND OBJECTIVITY
11.1 Thrasymachus's Challenge 149
12. WHY SHOULD WE BE MORAL?
12.1 The Ring of Gyges 165
13. THE MEANING OF LIFE
13.1 The Problem of the Point of View 180
Appendix: How to Evaluate Arguments 191
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In chapter 2, "God and the Origin of the Universe," the Not-By-Chance Argument has been reformulated and is now called the Best-Explanation Argument. Also, I have slightly reworded the Same-Evidence Argument. |
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In chapter 3, "The Problem of Evil," I've added a third objection to the subsection, "A Complete Account?" This objection asks why God doesn't intervene to prevent acts of extreme cruelty. |
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In chapter 4, "Do We Survive Death?" I have revised the critique of Socrates' argument for the simplicity of the soul. |
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In chapter 6, "Body and Mind," Descartes' Conceivability Argument for Dualism has been added to section 6.1, and a materialist response to it now appears at the end of the subsection on the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Also, I have added a brief subsection on "Radical Emergence." |
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In chapter 7, "Could a Machine Think?" I have added a subsection called "The Tipping Point Objection" in response to the Piecemeal-Replacement Argument. Also, the chapter's conclusion is now gone, its content merged with the chapter's final subsection. |
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In chapter 9, "The Debate over Free Will," I've given another reason why the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics doesn't establish human freedom. Also, the discussion of "The Argument That We Cannot Predict Our Own Decisions" has been shortened, and "The Argument from Accountability" is no longer claimed to be transcendental. Most significantly, in section 9.4, "Ethics and Free Will," James Rachels claimed in the first edition that the failure of free will would not undermine our ordinary beliefs about human value and responsibility. With apologies, I now claim the opposite at the end of the chapter. |
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In chapter 12, "Why Should We Be Moral?" I point out some complications for the idea that we should be moral in order to avoid hellfire. |